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Scientists anticipate that the problem of invasive alien species will be 
exacerbated by co-stressors of biodiversity, such as land clearing and 
climate change. One of the most effective means of regulating invasive 
alien species is to prevent their entry by implementing rigorous quarantine 
measures with strong border controls. Yet regulators face constant 
uncertainty, both with regard to the impact of invasive alien species on 
biodiversity, and also with the need to navigate a range of opinions on 
how best to deal with such uncertainty. These difficulties are illustrated by 
the differing approaches to uncertainty embodied by the World Trade 
Organization and the Convention on Biological Diversity. While the 
former emphasises the need for overcoming uncertainty, the latter also 
accommodates the need to manage uncertainty. This article explores the 
impasse resulting from these strategies and also analyses whether 
Australia’s Weed Risk Assessment provides a potential solution. It is 
argued that the Weed Risk Assessment can establish ‘plausible 
hypotheses’ that channel into the precautionary approach, giving 
regulators the flexibility of managing uncertainty by implementing 
measures without the benefit of full and conclusive scientific evidence. 
What is not clear, however, is whether the information-based processes of 
the Weed Risk Assessment will satisfy the scientific certainty 
requirements of the World Trade Organization. 
I Introduction 
Towards the middle of 2010, the Australian media reported the discovery of a 
breeding colony of cane toads in the southern suburbs of Sydney.1 The discovery 
                                                                 
  Dr Sophie Riley is Senior Lecturer in Law at the University of Technology, Sydney. 
1  Nicky Phillips and Eric Jensen, ‘Hopalong Catastrophe: Sydney Surrenders to Northern 
Invaders’, Sydney Morning Herald (online), 5 May 2010 <http://www.smh.com.au/ 
environment/conservation/hopalong-catastrophe-sydney-surrenders-to-northern-invaders-
20100504-u75m.html>; Audio: Cane Toads in Broome and Sydney, Australian Geographic  
(29 July 2010) <http://www.australiangeographic.com.au/journal/audio-cane-toads-breeding-
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was unexpected. Although scientific modelling had predicted the eventual 
expansion of the spread of cane toads south towards Sydney and, indeed, even 
further south towards Victoria,2 the toads were not projected to spread to Sydney 
by 2010.3  
Cane toads were originally introduced into the Australian State of 
Queensland in June 1935 by the Australian Bureau of Sugar Experimental 
Stations (‘BSES’)4 in the belief that they would control two native beetles, the 
french’s and greyback cane beetles, which were devastating the Australian sugar 
industry.5 Although not the subject of definitive studies, it is generally accepted 
that cane toads proved worthless in controlling the beetles,6 instead developing 
into a notorious predator that progressively kills and poisons an array of 
Australian native animals.7 Yet, for some 70 years after their introduction, cane 
toads were principally limited to the warmer regions of Northern Australia.  
Once cane toads commenced expanding their range, however, attempts at 
halting their spread were largely ineffective. By 2002 they had reached Kakadu 
National Park in the Northern Territory8 and by 2008 toads were steadily 
advancing southward.9 Efforts made at predicting the range of cane toads were 
complicated by the fact that they were proving more adaptable than originally 
anticipated and were further exacerbated by higher temperatures resulting from 
global climate change. In particular, global warming is driving cane toads 
beyond original estimates.10 Such complexities are indicative of the difficulties 
authorities face in designing regimes to manage invasive alien species (‘IAS’), 
while simultaneously dealing with uncertainty. 
At the international level, the environmental community has advocated 
the use of a precautionary approach.11 Effectively, alien species are presumed 
‘guilty’ unless demonstrated to be innocent. However, a presumption of guilt 
                                                                                                                                    
near-sydney.htm>; NSW Government, Environment and Heritage, Cane Toad – Key Threatening 
Process Listing (28 February 2011) <http://www.environment.nsw. gov.au/determinations/ 
BufoMarinusKtp.htm>. 
2  NSW Government, Environment and Heritage, above n 1. 
3  Ibid, detailing the unanticipated discovery of cane toads on the higher slopes of the Great 
Dividing Range.  
4  The Australian Bureau of Sugar Experimental Stations (‘BSES’) was formed in 1900 to enhance 
the profitability of the sugar cane industry: see <http://www.bses.org.au>.  
5  Australian Museum, Animal Species: Cane Toad (6 December 2011) 
<http://australianmuseum.net.au/Cane-Toad/>; CSIRO, The Cane Toad (2003) <http://www. 
csiro.au/proprietaryDocuments/CSE_ctfacts.pdf>. 
6  CaneToadsinOZ.com, Debunking Myths about Cane Toad Impact <http://www.canetoadsinoz 
.com/ debunkingcanetoadimpactmyths.html>. 
7  NSW Government, Environment and Heritage, Case Study – Cane Toads (Bufo Marinus)  
(26 February 2011) <http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/pestsweeds/PestAnimalsCaneToads.htm>; 
B Grace, ‘Cane Toads and Top End Fish’ (2008) 42 Fishnote 1.  
8  RA Van Dam, DJ Walden and GW Begg, A Preliminary Risk Assessment of Cane Toads in 
Kakadu National Park Scientist Report 164, Supervising Scientist (2002) 
<http://www.environment.gov.au/ssd/publications/ ssr/pubs/ssr164.pdf>.  
9  NSW Government, Environment and Heritage, above n 1, [8]. 
10  Ibid. 
11  See discussion in part III of this article. 
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against alien species often encumbers regulators with making decisions before 
they have acquired a high degree of certainty with regard to the invasive qualities 
of these species12 – a methodology that is not embraced by all international 
regimes. The World Trade Organization (‘WTO’),13 for example, eschews the 
anticipatory nature of precautionary measures and instead emphasises the need 
for scientific certainty;14 hence, the WTO regards alien species as ‘innocent’ 
until proven guilty. The differing procedures endorsed by these two approaches 
crystallise in the evaluation processes that determine whether regulators should 
permit the introduction of alien species. This article explores the impasse 
resulting from these divergent approaches and analyses whether Australia’s 
Weed Risk Assessment provides a potential solution. 
The article commences with a review of how IAS threaten biodiversity, 
highlighting the uncertainty that surrounds this area of regulation. The discussion 
follows with an analysis of ‘uncertainty’ in the context of international 
environmental law and also within the WTO, focussing on import risk analysis 
as a precursor to strong border controls. 
It is argued that the WTO rules are based on overcoming uncertainty and 
avoiding type I errors, that is false positive results, which indicate a species is 
likely to become invasive. Conversely, the precautionary approach envisages that 
regulators should manage uncertainty; and is based on averting type II errors, 
that is, false negative results which indicate a species is not likely to be invasive. 
It is further argued that where a ‘plausible hypothesis’ demonstrates the 
likelihood of a species becoming invasive, this should be sufficient to justify 
precautionary measures in order to avert type II errors.  
The differences between the approaches of international environmental 
law and the WTO are starkly evident in their treatment of inconclusive evidence. 
In this case, the rules of the WTO amount to a ‘heads I win, tails you lose’ 
scenario that channels plentiful, though inconclusive, evidence into the risk 
assessment process. Yet, the very fact that the evidence is inconclusive means 
that it cannot form the basis of measures. The discussion concludes by evaluating 
Australia’s Weed Risk Assessment as a possible way forward – although it is not 
clear whether the information-based processes of the Weed Risk Assessment will 
satisfy the scientific certainty requirements of the WTO. 
  
                                                                 
12  Richard D Horan et al, ‘Biological Pollution Prevention Strategies Under Ignorance: The Case of 
Invasive Species’ (2002) 84 American Journal of Agricultural Economics 1303, 1303.  
13  Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature  
15 April 1994, 1867 UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 1995) (‘Marrakesh Agreement’). The 
WTO has 153 members: see <http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm>.  
14  Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Products (Hormones), WTO Doc WT/DS/26/AB/R (16 January 1998), [123] 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ ds26_e.htm> (‘EC – Hormones’). 
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II Biodiversity and Invasive Alien Species 
Invasive alien species are alien species that threaten ecosystems, habitats or other 
species.15 The threats to biodiversity posed by IAS have been extensively 
documented,16 and include predation on native species,17 modification of 
habitat18 and introducing pests and diseases.19 Each of these impacts has the 
potential to lead to irreversible outcomes, such as species’ extinctions.20  
                                                                 
15  Conference of the Parties of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Report of the Sixth Meeting of 
the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity Held in The Hague  
7–19 April 2002, UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/6/20 (27 May 2002), definitions in footnote 57 paras 
(i), (ii) <http://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/cop/cop-06/official/cop-06-20-en.pdf> (‘COP-6 Report’). 
16  Carol M Brown, ‘Tilapia and the Environment’ (1995) 4(2) Ted Case Studies, case no 208, 
<http://www.american.edu/TED/tilapia.htm>; E Grossman, ‘Nile Perch, Trade and Environment’ 
(1995) 4(2) Ted Case Studies, case no 206 <http://www.american.edu/TED/perch.htm> ]; Ted 
Center, J Howard Frank and Allen F Dray, ‘Biological Invasions: Stemming the Tide in Florida’ 
(1995) 78(1) Florida Entomologist 45; Steve L Coles and L Eldredge, ‘Nonindigenous Species 
Introductions on Coral Reefs: A Need for Information’ (2002) 56 Pacific Science 191; Lyle 
Glowka, ‘Bioprospecting, Alien Invasive Species, and Hydrothermal Vents: Three Emerging 
Legal Issues in the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biodiversity’ (2000) 13 Tulane 
Environmental Law Journal 329; Lyle Glowka and Cyril de Klemm, ‘International Instrument, 
Processes and Non-indigenous Species Introductions – Is a Protocol Necessary?’ (1996) 
Environmental Policy and Law 247; Peter Jenkins, ‘Paying for Protection from Invasive Species’ 
(2002) Fall, Issues In Science And Technology 67; T McDowell, ‘Slow-Motion Explosion: The 
Global Threat of Exotic Species and the International Response to the Problem in the South 
Pacific’ (1998) 9 Colorado Journal Of Environmental Law and Policy 187; Jeffrey A McNeely, 
‘Invasive Species: A Costly Catastrophe for Native Biodiversity’ (2002) 1(2) Land Use And Water 
Resources Research 1; Anne Perrault, Anne and William Carroll Muffett, ‘Turning off the Tap: A 
Strategy to Address International Aspects of Invasive Alien Species’ (2002) 11 Review Of 
European Community & International Environmental Law 211; Jeffrey A McNeely (ed), Global 
Strategy for Addressing the Problem of Invasive Alien Species (2000) Convention on Biological 
Diversity <https://www.cbd.int/doc/principles/ais-strategy-gisp.pdf>; Marc Miller, ‘Biological and 
Cultural Camouflage: The Challenges of Seeing the Harmful Invasive Species Problem and Doing 
Something About It’ in Marc Miller and R Fabian, Harmful Invasive Species: Legal Responses 
(Environmental Law Institute, 2004); SSC Invasive Species Specialist Group, IUCN Guidelines 
for the Prevention of Biodiversity Loss Caused by Alien Invasive Species (2000) IUCN, [1] 
<http://intranet.iucn.org/webfiles/doc/SSC/SSCwebsite/Policy_statements/IUCN_Guidelines_for_
the_Prevention_of_Biodiversity_Loss_caused_by_Alien_Invasive_Species.pdf>. 
17  Brown, above n 16.  
18  I Wallentinus and C D Nyberg, ‘Introduced Marine Organisms as Habitat Modifiers’ (2007)  
55 Marine Pollution Bulletin 323, 325–7.  
19  Clare Shine, Nattley Williams and Lothar Gündling, A Guide to Designing Legal and 
Institutional Frameworks on Alien Invasive Species (IUCN, 2000) [1.4]. 
20  R Wittenberg (ed), An Inventory of Alien Species and their Threat to Biodiversity and Economy 
in Switzerland. CABI Bioscience Switzerland Centre to the Swiss Agency for Environment, 
Forests and Landscape (2005) 26 <http://www.nobanis.org/files/invasives%20in%20CH.pdf>; 
K Stokes, K O’Neill and R McDonald, Invasive Species in Ireland (Unpublished report to 
Environment & Heritage Service and National Parks & Wildlife Service, Quercus, Queens 
University Belfast, Belfast, 2004) [1.6] <http://www.botanicgardens.ie/ 
gspc/pdfs/quercusreport.pdf>; Environment Protection Authority, NSW State of the Environment 
1997, [2.6]; Greg Sherley and Sarah Lowe, ‘Towards a Regional Invasive Species Strategy for 
the South Pacific: Issues and Options’ in G Sherley (ed), Invasive species in the Pacific:  
A Technical Review and Draft Regional Strategy (South Pacific Regional Environment 
Programme, 2000) 7–8. 
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Moreover, scientists anticipate that co-stressors to biodiversity, such as 
land clearing21 and climate change,22 will intensify the dangers posed by IAS. 
Both land clearing and changes in temperature patterns, for example, provide 
alien species with opportunities to expand their ranges.23 As this occurs, so too 
will ‘homogenization of the global biota’, resulting in loss of biodiversity.24  
In central and South America, large numbers of harlequin frogs have already 
disappeared due to a chytrid fungus that is most active in warmer temperatures.25 
Indeed, the fact that regulators need to deal with co-stressors adds another 
dimension and level of complexity to IAS regulation. 
As mentioned, stopping introductions of IAS is considered the most cost-
effective policy.26 Yet, in designing regimes, regulators face many challenges, 
not the least of which is dealing with uncertainty.27 In the context of IAS, 
uncertainty stems from inconclusive or incomplete evidence with respect to the 
invasive qualities of a species,28 the impact of IAS on biodiversity,29 the best 
                                                                 
21  Australian Government, Factors Influencing Weeds (14 September 2007) <http://www.weeds 
.gov.au/ weeds/why/factors.html>. 
22  John Stachowicz et al, ‘Linking Climate Change and Biological Invasions: Ocean Warming 
Facilitates Nonindigenous Species Invasions’ (2002) 99 Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences of the United States of America 15 497, 15 497. With respect to the impact of IAS and 
climate change, see Tim Low, ‘Climate Change and Invasive Species: A Review of Interactions’ 
(November 2006 Workshop Report) Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, 
Population and Communities, 3, 10 <http://www.environment.gov.au/biodiversity/publications/ 
pubs/interactions-cc-invasive.pdf>. 
23  Stachowicz et al, above n 22, 15 497; Low, above n 22, 10; Willfried Thuiller, David Richardson 
and Guy Midgley, ‘Will Climate Change Promote Alien Plant Invasions?’ (2007) 193 Ecological 
Studies 197, 197–8. 
24  Stachowicz et al, above n 22, 15 497.  
25  Low, above n 22, 10; see also Will Steffen et al, Australia’s Biodiversity and Climate Change 
(Summary for Policy Makers 2009) (2009) Department of Climate Change and Energy 
Efficiency, 6 <http://www.climatechange.gov.au/~/media/publications/biodiversity/biodiversity-
summary-policy-makers. ashx>, detailing threats to Kakadu National Park by the combined 
effects of invasive plants and animals and climate change; Tracy Benning et al, ‘Interactions of 
Climate Change with Biological Invasions and Land Use in the Hawaiian Islands: Modeling the 
Fate of Endemic Birds Using a Geographic Information System’(2002) 99 Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 14 246, where the authors note 
that the Hawaiian honeycreeper is predicted to become extinct on the islands of Kauai and 
Hawaii as a result of the combined effects of climate change and the spread of introduced 
predators and diseases. 
26  NSW Inter-agency Biodiversity and Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation Working Group, 
NSW Biodiversity and Climate Change Adaptation Framework 2007–2008 (October 2007) 
<http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/resources/threatenedspecies/0762biodivccadapt.pdf> 26.  
27  L Joe Moffit, John K Stranlund and Craig D Osteen, ‘Robust Detection Protocols for Uncertain 
Introductions of Invasive Species’ (2008) 89 Journal of Environmental Management 293, 294; 
Peter Caley, W M Lonsdale and P C Pheloung, ‘Quantifying Uncertainty in Predictions of 
Invasiveness’ (2006) 8 Biological Invasions 277, 278; Daniel Simberloff, ‘Global Climate 
Change and Introduced Species in United States Forests’ (2000) 262 The Science of the Total 
Environment 253, 256.  
28  Horan et al, above n 12, 1306; Iftikhar U Sikder, Sanchita Mal-Sarkar and Tarun K Mal, 
‘Knowledge-Based Risk Assessment Under Uncertainty for Species Invasion’ (2006) 26 Risk 
Analysis 239, 240. 
29  See generally, Kurt K Benke, Jackie L Steel and John E Weiss, ‘Risk Assessment Models for 
Invasive Species: Uncertainty in Rankings from Multi-criteria Analysis’ (2011) 13 Biological 
Invasions 239 <http://www.springerlink.com/content/68893n3488512123/fulltext.pdf>. 
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means of eradicating or containing IAS,30 and uncertainty with respect to the 
combined impacts of IAS and co-stressors to biodiversity.31 The regulator’s task 
is further compounded by the need to consider strategies that traverse an array of 
regulatory domains.32 In designing strong border controls, States need to take 
into account obligations and commitments pursuant to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (‘CBD’),33 the international trade law regime34 and the 
impact of these obligations on domestic quarantine systems.  
Given the uncertainty that surrounds IAS regulation, an important 
consideration is how these domains deal with uncertainty. In particular, 
international law exerts powerful constraints on national action, as is evident in 
the tension between the ideals of global free trade and protection of the 
environment.35 While the former emphasises the need for scientific certainty, the 
latter emphasises the need for action based on precaution in the face of scientific 
uncertainty. This difference of opinion is illustrated by the individual approaches 
to the regulation of IAS embodied in the CBD, on the one hand, and the 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(‘SPSA’),36 on the other.  
                                                                 
30  Mark E Eiswerth and G Cornelis van Kooten, ‘Uncertainty, Economics and the Spread of 
Invasive Plant Species’ (2002) 84 The American Journal of Agricultural Economics 1317, 1321. 
31  Uncertainty can stem from many sources, including insufficient information, ‘statistical 
variation, measurement error, variability … subjective judgment and disagreement’: Stephen 
Schneider and Dristin Kuntz-Duriseti, ‘Uncertainty and Climate Change Policy’ in Stephen 
Schneider, Armin Rosencranz and John Niles (eds), Climate Change and Policy: A Survey 
(Island Press, 2002) 55; see also Rajendra Pachauri and Andy Reisinger (eds), IPCC Fourth 
Assessment Report, Climate Change 2007 (Synthesis Report, IPCC, 2007) 27; Guy Midgley and 
Wilfried Thuiller, ‘Global Environmental Change and the Uncertain Fate of Biodiversity’ (2005) 
167 New Phytologist 638, 638; Thuiller, Richardson and Midgley, ‘Will Climate Change 
Promote Alien Plant Invasions?’, above n 23, 197. 
32  Moffit, Stranlund and Osteen, above n 27, 299; Congressional Budget Office, Uncertainty in 
Analyzing Climate Change: Policy Implications (2005), xiii <http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs 
/60xx/doc6061/01-24-ClimateChange.pdf>; Sikder, Mal-Sarkar and Mal, above n 28, 240. 
33  Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature 5 June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79 (entered 
into force 29 December 1993) (‘CBD’). There are 193 Parties to the Convention 
<http://www.cbd.int/convention/parties/ list/>. 
34  The World Trade Organization (‘WTO’) has been selected for this part of the article as it is the 
most influential of the international trade law regimes. Not only does the WTO have a 
substantial membership base, but, also, where WTO members negotiate free trade agreements 
outside the WTO, these agreements invariably affirm existing rights and obligations under the 
WTO. See, for example, Australia–US Free Trade Agreement, signed 18 May 2004, [2005] ATS 
1 (entered into force 1 January 2005) <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/ other/dfat/treaties/2005/ 
1.html>. Article 7.3 affirms the provisions of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures: see n 36 below.  
35  See generally, Daniel Esty, Greening the GATT: Trade, Environment and the Future (Institute 
for International Economics, 1994); Fiona Macmillan, WTO and the Environment (Sweet and 
Maxwell, 2001). 
36  Marrakesh Agreement 1867 UNTS 3 annex 1A (‘Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures’) (‘SPSA’). The SPSA is a specific agreement that provides a primary 
source of rights and obligations for WTO members with respect to quarantine. Marrakesh 
Agreement 1867 UNTS 3 annex 1A (‘General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994’) (‘GATT’) 
provides a basis of rights and obligations only where one of the more specific agreements, such 
as the SPSA, does not apply. See Marrakesh Agreement 1867 UNTS 3 art 1A; see also art 2.4 of 
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III Precaution or Scientific Certainty? 
The need to exercise precaution with respect to alien species is not new. As early 
as 1909, the botanist Alfred Ewart said of potentially invasive plants being 
considered for introduction into Victoria:  
It is not too much to say that no new plant should be introduced into this 
State [Victoria], and not even a private garden, if there is any chance of it 
spreading, unless an official report on its capacities for good and evil had 
been obtained, and unless the report is a favourable one.37 
It is implicit in Ewart’s statement that, in exercising precaution, regulators 
should evaluate the invasive qualities of alien species and disallow entry to those 
species considered harmful or potentially harmful. This standpoint is consistent 
with the formulation of the precautionary approach in international 
environmental law, including within the CBD.  
Parties to the CBD are under obligations to ensure that biodiversity is 
conserved and used sustainably.38 More specifically, art 8(h) of the CBD requires 
the contracting parties to ‘prevent the introduction of or control or eradicate 
those alien species that threaten ecosystems, habitats or species’. Detailed 
guidance for implementing art 8(h) is provided by the ‘Guiding Principles for the 
Prevention, Introduction and Mitigation of Impacts of Alien Species that 
Threaten Ecosystems Habitats or Species’ (‘CBD Guiding Principles’), which 
have been adopted by the Conference of the Parties.39 The significance of 
prevention is emphasised by the three-tiered regulatory approach of the CBD 
Guiding Principles, which stresses preventing introductions of IAS, followed by 
eradication and control measures.40 The importance of preventative measures is 
further reinforced by the fact that the Principles commence with a reference to 
the precautionary approach, stating that decisions ‘should be based on the 
precautionary approach … [as] … set forth in principle 15 of the 1992 Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development’.41 
Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development42 
(‘Rio Declaration’) provides that: ‘Where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason 
                                                                                                                                    
the SPSA, which stipulates that, where measures comply with the SPSA, this amounts to a 
presumption of compliance with, inter alia, GATT art XX(b). 
37  Alfred Ewart, quoted in Tim Low, Feral Future (Viking, 1999) 29. 
38  CBD art 6. Article 2 of the CBD defines biodiversity as the ‘the variability among living 
organisms … and the ecological complexes of which they are part [including] diversity within 
species, between species and of ecosystems’. 
39  COP-6 Report annex 1, decision VI/23, annex (‘Guiding Principles for the Prevention, 
Introduction and Mitigation of Impacts of Alien Species that Threaten Ecosystems Habitats or 
Species’) (‘CBD Guiding Principles’).  
40  Ibid principle 2. 
41  Ibid principle 1. 
42  Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UN GAOR, UN Doc A/CONF.151/26Rev.1 
(vol 1) (12 August 1992) (‘Rio Declaration’). 
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for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.’43 
This principle uses qualifying descriptors such as ‘serious or irreversible’ 
damage and ‘full scientific certainty’. As such, principle 15 is in fact indicative 
of an ‘approach’ to be applied in cases of significant threat, rather than an 
overarching ‘principle’ guiding policy in all circumstances.  
Although the approach/principle debate occupies an important place in 
the literature,44 it is not the objective of this article to revisit this topic. Suffice it 
to say that without taking a stance on which formulation is the most appropriate, 
the CBD Guiding Principles refer to the ‘precautionary approach’45 and hence 
this terminology is adopted for the discussion that follows. The salient point is 
that states face overriding responsibilities based on notions of prevention and 
precaution. The trigger for measures is either the point where scientific evidence 
indicates that a species is a known threat to biodiversity; or where there is some 
evidence indicating that the species is likely to be invasive, although the 
evidence is incomplete or inconclusive. These commitments differ from 
obligations deriving from the rules of international trade law (as illustrated, for 
example, by the WTO), which call for scientific certainty to support measures.  
The WTO commenced on 1 January 1995 in accordance with the Marrakesh 
Agreement. That Agreement also contains a set of annexures, designed to deal 
with technical matters, including the SPSA. An objective underpinning the 
negotiation and adoption of the SPSA was the desire by states to prevent 
quarantine measures from being used as an unnecessary restraint on international 
trade.46 Accordingly, the SPSA is particularly relevant to the design and 
implementation of border controls designed to prevent the entry of IAS.47  
                                                                 
43  Philippe Sands and Paolo Galizzi, Documents in International Environmental Law (Cambridge, 
2003) 17. 
44  For example, the Rio Declaration principle 15 uses the terminology ‘precautionary approach’ in 
the context of serious or irreversible environmental damage: see, for discussion, Owen McIntyre 
and Thomas Mosedale, ‘The Precautionary Principle as a Norm of Customary International Law’ 
(1997) 9 Journal of Environmental Law 221; Justice Paul Stein, ‘Are Decision-makers too 
Cautious with the Precautionary Principle?’ (2000) 17 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 
3, 4; Cameron Hutchinson, ‘International Environmental Law Attempts to be “Mutually 
Supportive” with International Trade Law: A Compatibility Analysis of the Cartagena Protocol 
to the Convention on Biological Diversity with the World Trade Organisation Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures’ (2001) 4 Journal of International Wildlife 
Law & Policy 1, [5.3]; Henk van den Belt, ‘Debating the Precautionary Principle: “Guilty until 
Proven Innocent” or “Innocent until Proven Guilty”?’ (2003) 132 Plant Physiology 1122  
(the latter in particular discusses the Wingspread Statement of the precautionary principle as an 
overarching principle that ‘affirmatively states that action should be taken’); Rosie Cooney,  
The Precautionary Principle in Biodiversity Conservation and Natural Resource Management: 
An Issues Paper for Policy-Makers, Researchers and Practitioners (IUCN, 2004) 8; B Goldstein 
and R Carruth, ‘The Precautionary Principle and/or Risk Assessment in World Trade 
Organization Decisions: A Possible Role for Risk Perception’ (2004) 24 Risk Analysis 491, 491–
2; Jacqueline Peel ‘Precaution – A Matter of Principle, Approach or Process?’ (2004)  
5 Melbourne Journal of International Law 483. 
45  CBD Guiding Principles, principle 1. Somewhat confusingly, the CBD Guiding Principles refer 
to the precautionary principle as articulated by principle 15 of the Rio Declaration and the 
preamble to the CBD, which are not formulated in identical terms.  
46  Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration (1986) 25 ILM 1623 part 1 preamble and part 1 D 
heading ‘Agriculture’ (iii); Donna Roberts, ‘Preliminary Assessment of the Effects of the WTO 
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The SPSA envisages that members follow a two-staged approach to their 
quarantine regimes, starting with the adoption of policy, followed by 
implementation of operational provisions. At the policy level, members need to 
determine and maintain a level of risk they consider appropriate, which, in the 
SPSA, is referred to as an ‘appropriate level of protection’ (‘ALOP’).48 At the 
operational level, members may implement only those measures that give effect 
to the ALOP.49 This constraint positions the ALOP as an upper ceiling beyond 
which measures cannot exceed.50 In addition, members need to ensure that their 
quarantine measures either adhere to international standards51 (as determined by 
bodies such as the World Organization for Animal Health (‘OIE’)52 and the 
International Plant Protection Convention (‘IPPC’)53) or are based on a risk 
assessment in accordance with arts 2.2 and 5.1 of the SPSA.54 Notions of 
                                                                                                                                    
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Trade Regulations’ (1998) 1 Journal of International 
Economic Law 377, 380; Steve Charnovitz, ‘The Supervision of Health and Biosafety Regulation 
by World Trade Rules’ (1999–2000) 13 Tulane Environmental Law Journal 271, 272; Donna 
Roberts, ‘The Integration of Economics in SPS Risk Management Policies: Issues and Challenges’ 
in Kym Anderson, Cheryl McRae and David Wilson (eds), The Economics of Quarantine and the 
SPS Agreement (Centre for International Economic Studies Adelaide, 2001) 9, 13. 
47  See art 1A of the Marrakesh Agreement and arts 2.4, 3.5 and 12.1 of the SPSA. For a discussion 
of the SPSA, see J Pauwelyn, ‘The WTO Agreement and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures as 
Applied in the First Three SPS Disputes’ (1999) Journal of International Economic Law 641. 
48  SPSA annex A art 5. Although there are no provisions in the SPSA that categorically declare a 
state must determine its ALOP, a state is expected to determine its ALOP prior to enactment of 
quarantine measures: see Appellate Body Report, Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of 
Salmon, WTO Doc WT/DS/18/AB/R (6 November 1998), [201] (‘Australia – Salmon’). 
Moreover, the requirement to set an ALOP is implicit in the wording of several provisions in the 
SPSA, such as art 4.1, which deals with equivalence, and arts 5.4 and 5.6, which refer to the least 
trade-restrictive measures, all of which proceed on the assumption that an ALOP has already 
been set: see Australia – Salmon [205]. For analysis of the ALOP, see J Atik, ‘The Weakest 
Link: Demonstrating the Inconsistency of “Appropriate Levels of Protection” in Australia – 
Salmon’ 24 Risk Analysis (2004) 483; S Henson, ‘The “Appropriate Level of Protection”:  
A European Perspective’ in Anderson, McRae and Wilson, above n 46, 105; Senate Rural and 
Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee, An Appropriate Level of Protection?  
The Importation of Salmon Products (June 2000) Parliament of Australia Senate <http://202.14. 
81.230/senate/committee/rrat_ctte/completed_inquiries/1999-02/salmon_final/report/a01.pdf>.  
49  SPSA art 2.2. 
50  Ibid; G Stanton, ‘The Multilateral Trading System and SPS Agreement’ in Quarantine and 
Market Access (Forum proceedings 6–7 September 2000, Department of Agriculture & Forestry, 
Canberra) 73, 75–6. 
51  SPSA art 3.2. 
52  SPSA annex A art 3(b); International Agreement for the Creation at Paris of an International 
Office for Dealing with Contagious Diseases of Animals, adopted 25 January 1924, [1925] ATS 
No 15 (entered into force 12 January 1925). The organization is now known as the ‘OIE’ and has 
178 members: see <http://www.oie.int/about-us/our-members/member-countries/>. The name of 
the OIE was originally the Office International des Epizooties. In May 2003 the name was 
changed to the World Organisation for Animal Health, with retention of the OIE acronym: see 
<http://www.oie.int/about-us/history/>  
53  SPSA annex A art 3(c); International Plant Protection Convention 1997, adopted 17 November 
1997 [2005] ATS No 23 (entered into force 2 October 2005) (‘IPPC’). The IPPC has  
177 parties: see <https://www.ippc.int/index.php?id=7&L=0>. 
54  SPSA arts 2.2 and 5; EC – Hormones, above n 14, [123], [124], [125]. See, for discussion, Kevin 
Kennedy, ‘Resolving International Sanitary and Phytosanitary Disputes in the WTO: Lessons 
and Future Directions’ (2000) 55 Food and Drug Law Journal 81, 95; Laurent A Ruessmann, 
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scientific certainty are therefore embedded into WTO processes by means of 
international standards and/or risk assessments.55 One concession to these 
obligations is found in art 5.7, which permits states to implement temporary 
measures where scientific evidence is ‘insufficient’. This article is discussed 
further below. 
Although both the precautionary approach and notions of scientific 
certainty proffer differing obligations and requirements, they also accommodate 
avenues for dealing with uncertainty. 
IV Dealing with Uncertainty 
The concept of uncertainty has been subject to considerable commentary and 
discussion,56 yet ascribing a precise meaning to it is still problematic.57 Its 
definitions and descriptions span from ‘confidence just short of certainty to 
informed guesses or speculation.’58 In accordance with the precautionary 
approach, uncertainty in IAS regulation refers to a level of scientific evidence 
that indicates a threat to biodiversity, although that evidence may not be fully 
complete or conclusive. 
In a practical sense, this presents challenges for regulators, not only 
deriving from enacting operational provisions with sparse or inconclusive 
scientific evidence,59 but also from difficulties at the policy level in determining 
how best to deal with incomplete or inconclusive information.60 In the latter case, 
regulators have three choices: reduce the level of uncertainty, reduce the effects 
of uncertainty,61 or use a combination of these methods. In practice, policy 
instruments recommend that decision-makers adopt regimes more closely 
aligned to the third alternative.62  
                                                                                                                                    
‘Putting the Precautionary Principle in its Place: Parameters for the Proper Application of a 
Precautionary Approach and the Implications for Developing States in the Light of the Doha 
WTO Ministerial’ (2002) 17 American University International Law Review 905, 935–6, 937. 
55  EC – Hormones, above n 14, [123], [124], [125]. See discussion in Kennedy, above n 54, 95; 
Ruessmann, above n 54, 935–7. 
56  See generally, Silvio O Funtowicz and Jerome R Ravetz, Uncertainty and Quality in Science for 
Policy (Kluwer, 1990); W E Walker et al, ‘Defining Uncertainty. A Conceptual Basis for 
Uncertainty Management in Model Based Decision Support’ (2003) 4(1) Integrated Assessment 
5; J P van der Sluijs, ‘Uncertainty and Precaution in Environmental Management: Insights from 
the UPEM Conference’ (2007) 22(5) Environmental Modelling and Software 590; Marcela 
Brugnach et al, ‘Toward a Relational Concept of Uncertainty: About Knowing Too Little, 
Knowing Too Differently, and Accepting Not to Know’ (2008) 13(2) Ecology and Society 30.  
57  Brugnach et al, above n 56.  
58  Schneider and Kuntz-Duriseti, above n 31, 55.  
59  Midgley and Thuiller, above n 31, 638; Thuiller, Richardson and Midgley, above n 23, 197. 
60  See, eg, M Webster et al, ‘Uncertainty Analysis of Climate Change and Policy Response’ (MIT 
Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, Report No 95, December 2002) 1–2 
<http://18.7.29.232/bitstream/handle/1721.1/3552/MITJPSPGC_Rpt95.pdf?sequence=1>. 
61  Schneider and Kuntz-Duriseti, above n 31, 55. 
62  Department of Environment and Climate Change NSW, Adaptation Strategy for Climate Change 
Impacts on Biodiversity (December 2007) NSW Government Environment & Heritage, 25–6 
<http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/resources/threatenedspecies/0765adaptstrat.pdf>; 
Congressional Budget Office, above n 32. 
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The first choice aims at reducing uncertainty through research, data 
collection and modelling.63 The objective is to transcend the uncertainty and 
make ‘known the unknown’.64 For example, regulators can collect data and use 
modelling to predict the invasive qualities of species, their potential ranges65 and 
their interaction with other stressors to biodiversity.66 In Australia, for example, 
the Australian Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO)67 is 
developing a model to map the expected change in distribution of weeds due to 
climate change;68 and in Hawaii scientists are using geographic information 
systems to predict the relationship between climate change and invasive 
species.69 The notion that uncertainty can be overcome underpins the scientific 
certainty requirements of the SPSA.70 Consequently, WTO members need to 
adduce a sufficiently high level of scientific evidence to justify their quarantine 
measures.71 
Yet, in general, the notion that techniques of research and modelling can 
fully overcome uncertainty has limitations. To start with, modelling techniques ‘do 
not always consider all variables’72 and, consequently, tend to capture linkages and 
relationships somewhat inconsistently.73 Modelling related to IAS, for example, 
may not adequately take into account lag times. Studies indicate that it is not 
unusual for species to manifest invasive qualities an average of 147 years after 
their introduction,74 with some reports increasing this figure to 170 years.75 In a 
similar vein, co-stressors of biodiversity — for example, greenhouse gases already 
present in the atmosphere — will continue to contribute to climate change and 
have a cascading effect on the control of IAS for many decades to come.76  
Another difficulty stems from the ‘transient’ nature of environmental 
problems.77 Ecosystems are not static and stressors such as land clearing and 
climate change will add to the shifting dynamics within ecosystems and of 
ecosystems themselves.78 Where these changes are so great that it is not possible 
                                                                 
63  Schneider and Kuntz-Duriseti, above n 31, 55. 
64  Ibid.  
65  For a discussion of the various models, see Sikder, Mal-Sarkar and Mal, above n 28, 240–3; 
Jonathan Jeschke and David Strayer, ‘Usefulness of Bioclimatic Models for Studying Climate 
Change and Invasive Species’ (2008) 1134 Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1, 1, 8, 
10–11; Congressional Budget Office, above n 32, 25.  
66  Jeschke and Strayer, above n 65. 
67  The CSIRO leads Australia in scientific and industrial research in areas as diverse  
as preventative health, sustainable agriculture and mineral resources: see <http://www.csiro.au/>. 
68  Land & Water Australia, Defeating the Weed Menace R&D Project, Australian Government 
<http://lwa.gov.au/programs/defeating-weed-menace>. 
69  Tracy Benning et al, above n 25, 14 249. 
70  See discussion in part 5 of this article. 
71  See discussion in part 5 of this article. 
72  Tim Low, above n 22, 37. 
73  Congressional Budget Office, above n 32, 2.  
74  Wittenberg, above n 20, 26. 
75  Low, above n 37, 216–17.  
76  Congressional Budget Office, above n 32, 25. 
77  Steffen et al, above n 25, 6; Congressional Budget Office, above n 32, 2.  
78  Thuiller, Richardson and Midgley, above n 23, 199; Steffen et al, above n 25, 6; Congressional 
Budget Office, above n 32, 2.  
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to predict results, carrying out additional studies and modelling will not 
overcome uncertainty;79 at best it will amass copious amounts of inconclusive 
data that requires constant monitoring and updating. Consequently, the use of 
modelling techniques, research and study can diminish uncertainty, but is 
unlikely to eliminate it.80  
This assertion, however, does not indicate that devoting effort towards 
scientific certainty should be abandoned. Rather, regulators should adopt more 
flexible management practices that acknowledge uncertainty and incorporate it 
into regimes. Hence the importance of the second and third regulatory 
alternatives: managing the uncertainty.81  
The precautionary approach represents a way of managing uncertainty 
that in international environmental law is a well-accepted premise, including in 
the field of IAS regulation.82 However, regulators still need to identify an 
appropriately compelling threshold of significant or serious threat to the 
environment in order to trigger the application of measures. Although 
determining this threshold requires a degree of scientific certainty, the 
formulation of the precautionary approach does not rely on overcoming the 
uncertainty. To the contrary, the function of the precautionary approach is to 
permit measures, even though available scientific evidence is not sufficiently 
certain or conclusive. 
In the international arena, the differences between overcoming 
uncertainty and managing uncertainty unfurl as two distinct strategies that 
regulators struggle to balance. Considered from a trade-related perspective, the 
problem of uncertainty flows from the need to prevent states using alien species 
to create unnecessary trade barriers and, in particular, to stop states asserting that 
lack of knowledge or inconclusive knowledge should permit them to implement 
measures that are more trade restrictive than required. From an environmental 
perspective, the problem emanates from the concern that regulators should be at 
liberty to prevent entry of potentially invasive species, even in the absence of 
conclusive scientific certainty as to the invasive qualities of these species. If the 
threshold is set too low, it can result in ‘false positives’ or type I errors, leading 
to implementation of unnecessary, and perhaps costly, measures.83 If the bar is 
set too high, it can result in ‘false negatives’ or type II errors, and the 
introduction of potentially invasive species with calamitous consequences for 
biodiversity. 
                                                                 
79  Brugnach et al, above n 56.  
80  Congressional Budget Office, above n 32, 25. 
81  Steffen et al, above n 25, 15; Paul Baer and James Risbey, ‘Uncertainty and Assessment of the 
Issues Posed by an Urgent Climate Change. An Editorial Comment’ (2009) 92 Climatic Change 
31, 31; Brugnach et al, above n 56, 30.  
82  See, eg, discussion in part 3 of this article regarding CBD Guiding Principles principle 1 and  
Rio Declaration principle 15. 
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Acknowledging that the same problem can be framed in different ways 
has been described as taking a ‘relational approach’ to uncertainty.84 In other 
words, regulators observe uncertainty from the numerous and contradictory ways 
that the problem presents itself.85 In the midst of competing views, regulators 
should take uncertainty into account in a wider context that incorporates the 
objectives of each regime.86 Instead of the problem of IAS being viewed as a 
trade or an environmental problem, it should be viewed as a trade and an 
environmental problem. Since WTO processes are based on reducing 
uncertainty, while the CBD Guiding Principles favour reducing the effects of 
uncertainty, taking a relational approach means that regulators need to concede 
that ‘solutions do not exclusively consist of eliminating or reducing 
uncertainty’.87  
Yet, either way, regulators still need to rely on scientific evidence to 
determine when to implement measures and what type of measures to initiate. A 
suggested method lies in identifying patterns that indicate a causal link between 
stressors to biodiversity and resultant threats or harm to biodiversity — a concept 
expressed as a ‘plausible hypothesis’.88 
The concept of ‘plausibility’ describes a proposition that remains 
persuasive until an alternative is shown to be more credible.89 This formulation 
draws on the work of the ancient philosopher Carneades,90 who stated that 
plausibility commences with the proposition that, what appears to be true is 
tentatively true if it is contextually consistent with ‘other things that appear to be 
true’.91 As a means of dealing with uncertainty, ‘plausibility’ affords the 
following guidelines:92 that regulators may invoke notions of plausibility where 
it is not possible to determine the actual state of affairs with certainty; that a 
statement is not plausible if it contradicts a known state of affairs; and that, in the 
absence of a known state of affairs, two contradictory statements may still be 
plausible.93 In order to determine whether statements contradict a known state of 
affairs, or whether more credible propositions can apply, plausible hypotheses 
will need to be tested with alternatives and probabilities.94 The significance of 
plausible hypotheses is that their application is not dependent on the person 
                                                                 
84  See generally, Brugnach et al, above n 56.  
85  Ibid 35, 38. 
86  Ibid 41. 
87  Ibid 30. 
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92  See, eg, Joseph Margolis, ‘Robust Relativism’ (1976) 35(1) Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism 37; Joseph Margolis, ‘Plain Talk About Interpretation on a Relativistic Model’ (1995) 
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knowing or believing something to be true, but instead is ‘a guide to action’.95  
In essence, by creating a presumption that applies until evidence is adduced to 
the contrary, ‘plausibility’ pinpoints the stage where the precautionary approach 
can become operational.96  
By way of example, these reference points can be applied to uncertainty 
in IAS regulation in accordance with the work of Simberloff.97 Simberloff has 
noted that, notwithstanding the sparsity and inconclusiveness of scientific studies 
and knowledge with respect to IAS and co-stressors such as climate change, 
‘plausible hypotheses’ single out climate change as being a significant driver of 
loss of biodiversity.98 He emphasises, for example, that geographic ranges of 
species are already known to be dependent on climate patterns,99 thus 
establishing a link between climate change and the spread of species, including 
alien species. Once this link is established, a review of existing data on alien 
species, their invasive potential and their impacts on biodiversity makes it 
plausible that climate change will escalate invasion rates and increase threats to 
biodiversity. As a plausible hypothesis, this can channel into the precautionary 
approach, giving regulators the option of considering remedial measures, even if 
they do not have sufficient evidence to claim ‘scientific certainty’.  
The question, however, is whether taking this course of action will lead to 
successful challenges against the legitimacy of measures within the WTO.  
V Heads I Win, Tails You Lose: Uncertainty and 
the Legitimacy of Measures 
In accordance with the rules of the WTO, states can demonstrate that their 
measures are underpinned by scientific certainty, either by using international 
standards or by undertaking their own ‘risk assessment’.100 The content and 
scope of these processes are set out in arts 2.2 and 5 of the SPSA101 and have also 
been considered in a number of WTO decisions including European 
Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) 
(‘EC – Hormones’)102 and Japan – Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples 
(‘Japan – Apples’).103  
                                                                 
95  Walton, above n 89, 153.  
96  The concept of plausibility also feeds into the use of null hypotheses, discussed in part 7 of this 
article. 
97  Simberloff, above n 27, 256.  
98  Ibid.  
99  Ibid 257. 
100  Defined in SPSA annex A(4). 
101  See, eg, SPSA art 5.1, which obliges parties to carry out a risk assessment; see also SPSA arts 5.2 
and 5.3, which provide guidance to states on the types of matters to be taken into account in a 
risk assessment, as well as the choice of measures to manage the risk. 
102  EC – Hormones, above n 14. 
103  Appellate Body Report, Japan – Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples, WTO Doc 
WT/DS245/AB/R (26 November 2003), [196] (‘Japan – Apples’); see also Appellate Body 
Report, Japan – Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, WTO Doc WT/DS76/AB/R  
(22 February1999), [72]–[94] (‘Japan – Agricultural’); Australia – Salmon, above n 48, [121].  
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If a state has not based its measures on international standards, or carried 
out any, or any proper, risk assessment, this constitutes a breach of art 5.1 of the 
SPSA, leading to the measures being declared invalid.104 Regulators need to be 
cognisant of two issues that warrant more detailed examination: the degree of 
certainty of the scientific evidence and the sufficiency of the scientific evidence.  
A Scientific Certainty — How Certain Must the Science Be? 
As already discussed, in accordance with WTO rules, a state cannot exceed its 
ALOP when implementing quarantine measures. Consequently, whether a state 
uses international standards or a risk assessment, each of these methods should 
identify, evaluate and differentiate between risks that breach a state’s ALOP and 
those that do not. This means that the evaluation process needs to be precise 
enough and to contain scientific evidence that is certain enough to distinguish 
between different levels of risk.  
For example, the International Standards for Phytosanitary Measures 
(ISPM) number 11 developed by the IPPC105 provides that states need to 
identify and assess each pest for its potential to establish, spread and cause 
damage.106 Similarly, in animal quarantine, the OIE’s Aquatic Animal Health 
Code 2009 specifies that regulators should identify and evaluate each ‘hazard’ 
or pathogen that could produce adverse consequences.107 A comparable 
approach is taken with respect to risk assessments which the WTO Appellate 
Body has held should identify specific pests and diseases and the biological 
and economic consequences associated with the entry, establishment or spread 
of each pest and disease.108 These stipulations require a demanding level of 
knowledge to support measures and are reinforced by two findings from the 
decision in EC – Hormones.  
                                                                 
104  Australia – Salmon, above n 48, [136]. As a preliminary issue, the Appellate Body has confirmed 
that a risk assessment is needed for measures that were enacted before the entry into force of the 
SPSA: EC – Hormones, above n 14, [126]–[130]. At [128] the Appellate Body stated: ‘Unlike 
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there are no longer “existing legislation” exceptions (so-called “grandfather rights”)’. However, 
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In this regard, the Appellate Body pointed out that SPSA art 5.1 refers to risk assessment being 
undertaken ‘as appropriate to the circumstances’. This could indicate that the Appellate Body is 
likely to be more accommodating with respect to pre-1995 measures, but, as it did not elaborate 
on what ‘appropriate in the circumstances’ meant, this issue is still open to debate. See, 
generally, EC – Hormones [129]–[130]. 
105  Secretariat of the International Plant Protection Convention, International Standards for 
Phytosanitary Measures, ISPM No 11, Pest Risk Analysis for Quarantine Pests Including 
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106  Ibid s 2 (‘Stage 2: Pest Risk Assessment’).  
107  OIE, Aquatic Animal Health Code (13th ed, 2010) ch 2.2 (‘Import Risk Analysis’) and, in 
particular, art 2.2.4, setting out the steps for risk assessment <http://www.oie.int 
/doc/ged/D7821.PDF>. 
108  Australia – Salmon, above n 48, [121]; Japan – Apples, above n 103, [196]. 
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The EC – Hormones dispute arose out of a ban imposed by the European 
Communities (EC)109 on beef imported from the US that had been grown using 
hormones. The first finding concerned the need to evaluate the type of hormones 
used. The EC had supported its import ban based on a risk assessment that 
contained general evaluations of the carcinogenic potential of hormones in meat, 
but without analysis of particular hormones. The Appellate Body held that this 
lack of detail was insufficient to underpin an import ban.110 The EC should have 
included an analysis of the carcinogenic potential of the specific hormones in 
question, together with a further analysis of their impact, as residues in meat 
derived from cattle which had been fed the hormones.111  
The second finding involved the need to evaluate any potential misuse in 
the administration of the hormones. In the original determination, the Panel112 
had perused two reports that the EC commissioned in the 1980s:113 the 1982 and 
1987 Lamming Reports.114 These reports indicated that, while the incidence of 
cancer from hormone use might be low, this was dependent upon the exercise of 
‘good agricultural/animal husbandry practice’.115 The EC had argued that it was 
not possible to police whether good practices had been followed and, 
consequently, these assessments did not take into consideration the potential for 
misuse of the hormone by those administering it to the animals.116 On appeal, the 
Appellate Body indicated that the EC should have conducted a risk assessment 
on this point.117 However, the difficulty in carrying out such an assessment lies 
in the difficulty science would have in predicting the extent of potential 
misuse.118 At least one study indicates that ‘quantitative assessments [of potential 
misuse] could vary by as much as eight orders of magnitude’.119  
For these reasons, evaluations conducted in accordance with either 
international standards or risk assessments involve very detailed studies, 
                                                                 
109  ‘The European Communities’ is the name given collectively within the WTO to the European 
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Canada, WTO Doc WT/DS48/R/CAN (18 August 1997); Panel Report, EC Measures 
Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) Complaint by the United States, WTO Doc 
WT/DS26/R/USA (18 August 1997). 
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119  Mike Nunn, ‘Quarantine Risk Analysis’ (1997) 41 Australian Journal of Agricultural and 
Resource Economics 572. 
PROTECTION OF BIODIVERSITY FROM ALIEN INVASIVE SPECIES 
155 
supported by large volumes of conclusive information.120 In both a practical and 
a legal sense, the requirements also affirm a high threshold for compliance.121  
In the case of IAS, this requirement means that states need to provide analyses of 
the invasive qualities of every IAS in question, including related information 
concerning the combined impacts of co-stressors to biodiversity. Given that few 
studies have examined the combined effects of IAS and co-stressors,122 these 
requirements pose significant hurdles to adopting policy and designing regimes 
in a preventative manner.  
The overwhelming degree of detail and certainty demanded by WTO 
processes is further demonstrated by considering an import request, made in 
2000, from the Philippine government to the Australian government to export 
bananas to Australia.123 The case raises important issues with respect to the 
introduction of potential IAS across international boundaries. It also 
demonstrates the complexity of the issues which, in this case, were so involved 
that the risk analysis process spanned almost a decade and generated four draft 
Import Risk Analysis (‘IRA’) reports,124 a final IRA report125 and two Senate 
Inquiries.126 Eventually, on 3 March 2009, Biosecurity Australia127 released a 
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gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/157965/2007-06b.pdf> and <http://www.daff.gov.au/__data/ 
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Australia, Administration of Biosecurity Australia – Revised Draft Import Risk Analysis for 
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Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee, Import Risk Analysis 
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statement informing stakeholders that the Australian Director of Animal and 
Plant Quarantine had ‘determined a quarantine policy for the importation of 
bananas from the Philippines’, subject to compliance with strict import 
restrictions in accordance with the Quarantine Act 1908 (Cth).128  
The second draft IRA evaluated whether the importation of bananas could 
lead to the accidental introduction of IAS in breach of Australia’s ALOP.129 To 
determine this point, the report detailed species found in the Philippines, such as 
weeds, mammals, frogs, reptiles and molluscs that could accidentally be 
transported with the bananas.130 It is important to keep in mind that the species 
evaluated by the report included species not only native to the Philippines, but 
also introduced into the Philippines, that could be further introduced from the 
Philippines to Australia.131 Moreover, the report evaluated all known alien 
species, whether or not these species were currently invasive. The fact that a 
species is already invasive in one location makes it more likely that it will be 
invasive elsewhere,132 but the reverse proposition cannot be assumed: a non-
invasive alien species may become invasive in a new location.  
The problem with this level of detail is that it is at least partly dependent 
on the depth of information amassed by the exporting state. It is not possible, for 
example, for the importing state to identify and assess individual species, unless 
the exporting state has knowledge of alien species found in its territory. Yet 
states have different resource levels and different priorities with respect to IAS 
and their environmental regimes. For example, in its 2006 report to the CBD,133 
the Philippines indicated that its IAS regime was inconsistent. It had not yet 
established a national target for controlling IAS134 and its activities regarding 
IAS largely emphasised invasive plants.135 Three years later, in 2009, the 
                                                                                                                                    
(IRA) for the Importation of Cavendish Bananas from the Philippines (June 2009) Parliament of 
Australia <http://www.aph.gov.au/binaries /senate/committee/rrat_ctte/bananas/report/report.pdf>. 
127  Biosecurity Australia is a government unit located within the Department of Agriculture 
Fisheries and Forestry (‘DAFF’) that carries out policy development, including determination of 
the level of risk Australia is prepared to accept with respect to imported goods and commodities: 
see generally <http://www.daff.gov.au/ba/about>. 
128  Biosecurity Australia, ‘Biosecurity Advice 2009/3: Biosecurity Policy Determination – 
Importation of Bananas from the Philippines’ (3 March 2009) Department of Agriculture 
Fisheries and Forestry <http://www.daff.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/1026951/ 
2009_03_Philippine_Banana_Determination_090303.pdf>. 
129  Ibid 295–326.  
130  Ibid 73, 295–326. 
131  Ibid 332, where the report discusses introduced mammals and amphibians that inhabit the 
Philippines. 
132  Rüdiger Wittenberg and M Cock (eds), Invasive Alien Species: A Toolkit of Best Prevention and 
Management Practices CAB International (Wallingford, 2001) 134. The toolkit states that one of 
the best indicators of a species’ invasive potential is whether it is invasive in other states, 
especially those with similar ‘ecological and climatic conditions’. 
133  Republic of the Philippines, Protected Areas and Wildlife Bureau, Department of Environment and 
Natural Resources, The Third Philippine National Report to the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(2006) Convention on Biological Diversity <http://www.cbd.int/doc/world/ph/ph-nr-03-en.pdf>. 
134  Ibid 32. 
135  Ibid 76–7, 98. 
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Philippines acknowledged that while IAS posed an ever-increasing problem,136 
the government was still to determine management plans for addressing IAS, 
although consultations were being held with stakeholders with a view to drafting 
a national framework.137  
The approach of the Philippines government is understandable, given the 
fact that all states face resource constraints and must prioritise their regulatory 
aims and objectives.138 However, without information on the nature and extent of 
IAS located in the exporting state, it will not be possible for the importing state 
to evaluate with accuracy which species are likely to be introduced, which 
species are likely to become invasive and the impact of climate change on such 
species. Moreover, because the risk assessment process as conceptualised within 
the WTO requires a high degree of detail, even if Australia had wanted to, it 
could not have invoked the precautionary approach as the tipping point for 
implementation of measures.139 Although the CBD Guiding Principles give the 
precautionary approach a prominent role in IAS regulation,140 the SPSA does not 
even include a reference to either this approach or its related concept, the 
precautionary principle.  
In EC – Hormones the EC had argued that the precautionary principle 
was an established principle of international law141 and, hence, could be used to 
justify precautionary measures banning beef grown using hormones in 
satisfaction of the provisions of the SPSA.142 The Appellate Body, however, held 
that it was ‘less than clear’ whether the precautionary principle had crystallised 
into a principle of customary international law.143 Moreover, even if it had, the 
principle could not override the provisions of arts 5.1 and 5.2 of the SPSA, which 
require members to base their measures on a risk assessment.144  
The Appellate Body further described the precautionary principle as an act 
of prudence145 and found that, while the principle was not written into the SPSA, it 
                                                                 
136  Republic of the Philippines, Assessing Progress Towards the 2010 Biodiversity Target: The 4th 
National Report to the Convention on Biological Diversity (2009) Convention on Biological 
Diversity, 20, 23–4, 34 <http://www.cbd.int/doc/world/ph/ph-nr-04-en.pdf>. 
137  Ibid 94. 
138  Resource constraints represent a significant hurdle to establishing adequate IAS regimes: see 
CBD 2003, Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical And Technological Advice, Note by the 
Executive Secretary, Invasive Alien Species: Identification of Specific Gaps and Inconsistencies 
in the International Regulatory Framework, UN Doc No UNEP/CBD/SBSTTA/9/INF/32  
(5 November 2003) [98]; Jenkins, above n 16, 69–70. 
139  Ultimately, Biosecurity Australia sidestepped this issue by concluding that frogs, other reptiles 
and molluscs were not pests of Cavendish bananas, but were contaminants that ‘would be subject 
to action under existing quarantine policy for contaminants of quarantine concern’: Biosecurity 
Australia, Final Import Analysis Report for the Importation of Cavendish Bananas from the 
Philippines, above n 125, 66. 
140  CBD Guiding Principles, principle 1, referring to the precautionary approach.  
141  EC – Hormones, above n 14, [121].  
142  Ibid. 
143  Ibid [123]. 
144  Ibid [123], [124], [125]. See discussion in Kennedy, above n 54, 95; Ruessmann, above n 54, 
935–6, 937. 
145  EC – Hormones, above n 14, [124]; see discussion in Peel, above n 44, 497–500. 
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was nevertheless reflected in a number of provisions of that Agreement, including 
art 5.7.146 This finding, however, raises a further set of problematic issues relating 
to the notion of ‘sufficiency’ of scientific evidence as used in art 5.7.  
B Scientific Certainty — How Sufficient Must the Science Be? 
As already indicated, art 5.7 of the SPSA permits states to implement temporary 
measures in the absence of international standards or sufficient scientific 
evidence, although the measures must be reviewed within a reasonable time. The 
article represents a qualified exemption from the general proscription against 
measures being maintained without sufficient scientific evidence.147 Article 5.7 
specifies that:  
In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member may 
provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary measures on the basis of 
available pertinent information … In such circumstances, Members shall 
seek to obtain the additional information necessary for a more objective 
assessment of risk and review the sanitary or phytosanitary measure 
accordingly within a reasonable period of time.  
The sufficiency of the scientific evidence is referred to, but not defined, in 
art 5.7. This is similar to the provisions of art 2.2, which prohibit states from 
maintaining permanent measures without sufficient scientific evidence.148 Given 
that arts 5.7 and 2.2 refer to the concept of sufficiency, regulators need to 
consider what is meant by the word ‘sufficient’ and whether the quality of 
evidence required for permanent measures under art 2.2 differs from the standard 
of evidence required for provisional measures under art 5.7. 
In Japan — Agricultural149 and Japan — Apples150 the Appellate Body 
held that the concept of ‘sufficiency’ in art 2.2 denotes a rational, or objective, 
relationship between a measure and the scientific evidence that depends ‘upon 
the particular circumstances of the case including the characteristics of the 
measure at issue and the quality and quantity of the scientific evidence’.151 
Consequently, quarantine measures cannot be maintained pursuant to art 2.2 
without a sufficient quality and quantity of scientific evidence that is 
                                                                 
146  EC – Hormones, above n 14, [124]. The other provisions of the SPSA that, according to the 
Appellate Body, reflect the precautionary principle are the preamble and art 3.3. These 
provisions permit members to implement measures based on standards higher than those found 
in international standards, where the measures give effect to a member’s ALOP. Where the 
measures are more stringent than those based on international standards, the measures must be 
scientifically justified by way of a risk assessment. 
147  Japan – Agricultural, above n 103, [80]. 
148  Japan – Apples, above n 103, [175]–[185]. See discussion in Pauwelyn, above n 47, 641. 
149  Japan – Agricultural, above n 103, [84]. For general discussion, see J Whitlock, ‘Japan – 
Measures Affecting Agricultural Products: Lessons for Future SPS Disputes Agricultural Trade 
Disputes’ (2002) 33 Law and Policy in International Business 741; Charnovitz, above n 46, 288; 
Victor, above n 121, 909–13; Oliver Landwehr, ‘Decisions of the Appellate Body of the World 
Trade Organization Japan – Measures Affecting Agricultural Products’ (1999) 10 European 
Journal of International Law 461.  
150  Japan – Apples, above n 103, 143–68. 
151  Japan – Agricultural, above n 103, [84], quoted with approval in Japan – Apples, above n 103, [162]. 
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proportional to the severity of the measure. In other words, the more trade 
restrictive a measure becomes, the greater the levels of quality and quantity in 
scientific evidence that are needed.152 
A somewhat different approach has been taken with respect to art 5.7.  
In Japan – Apples, Japan argued that art 5.7 could be interpreted as referring to 
an insufficiency of evidence, either where there was a lack of quantity of 
scientific evidence, or where there was a sufficient quantity, but the evidence 
was inconclusive or uncertain.153 In rejecting Japan’s argument, the Appellate 
Body said that the question to be answered is whether the evidence is sufficient 
to ‘permit the evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of, in 
this case, fire blight by Japan’.154 In addition, the concept of ‘sufficiency’ in art 
5.7 incorporates the quality, or reliability, of the evidence,155 but not necessarily 
its conclusiveness. The only question is whether there is enough reliable 
scientific information to conduct a risk assessment.  
The difficulty with this approach, however, is that arguably it does not 
take into account those situations where evidence is plentiful and reliable, but is 
nevertheless inconclusive; nor does the approach grapple with problems 
stemming from scientific evidence that is so inconclusive as to be uncertain.156 
These issues were the subject of an amicus curiae brief157 in European 
Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech 
Products158 (Biotech case). The amicus curiae brief explored the link between 
inconclusiveness and uncertainty in scientific evidence: 
In this regard, uncertainty is a critical factor in determining the quality of 
the relevant scientific evidence. In fact, uncertainty may be thought of as a 
continuum ranging from zero for certain information … to high levels for 
information with true uncertainty or indeterminacy … when the available 
information cannot appropriately describe the risks to human, animal, or 
plant life or health because of the lack of understanding of events and 
processes, [then] policy-makers cannot ignore the lack of quality of the 
scientific evidence. 159 
                                                                 
152  Hutchinson, above n 44, [6.6.1.1]. 
153  Japan – Apples, above n 103, [175]–[185].  
154  Ibid [179]. 
155  Ibid [185]. See ‘Dispute Settlement Commentary (DSC) Japan – Measures Affecting the 
Importation of Apples’(April 2006), 16 <www.worldtradelaw.net>. 
156  Japan – Apples, above n 103, [185]. See ‘Dispute Settlement Commentary (DSC) Japan – 
Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples’, 16 <www.worldtradelaw.net>.  
157  The amicus curiae brief was lodged collectively by the Center for International Environmental Law 
(CIEL), Friends of the Earth – United States (FOE-US), Defenders of Wildlife, Institute for 
Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP) and Organic Consumers Association – United States (OCA-
USA) in June 2004 <http://www.ciel.org/Publications/ECBiotech_AmicusBrief _2June04.pdf>. 
158  Panel Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of 
Biotech Products, WTO Docs WT/DS/291, WT/DS/292, WT/DS/293 (29 September 2006) 
World Trade Organization <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds291_e.htm> 
(‘Biotech case’) .  
159  Amicus curiae brief, above n 157, 37. 
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This reasoning indicates that where scientific evidence is so inconclusive or 
uncertain that it cannot identify risks, it should not be used to carry out a risk 
assessment.160 It is further reinforced by the fact that a high degree of uncertainty 
in the scientific evidence can also directly relate to the quality of the evidence. 
Often, states that seek to prevent entry of IAS will be faced with gaps and 
uncertainties in the knowledge base. As already indicated, these include 
uncertainty with respect to whether alien species will become invasive, 
uncertainty with respect to their impact on native biodiversity, and uncertainty 
concerning the combined impacts of IAS and other stressors of biodiversity.161 
To deny states the opportunity to implement measures where the evidence is 
inconclusive runs counter to the tenor of the precautionary approach, which has 
been formulated to guide decision-making where there is a lack of quantity of, as 
well as lack of conclusiveness in, the scientific evidence.  
Moreover, under art 2.2 of the SPSA, the same level of uncertainty that 
prevents the implementation of provisional measures would also be considered 
relevant to whether there was an adequate rational, or objective, relationship 
between a quarantine measure and the scientific evidence. In the absence of such 
a relationship, the measure will not be upheld.  
This last point is also directly relevant to the question whether the quality of 
evidence required for permanent measures under art 2.2 differs from the standard 
of evidence required for provisional measures under art 5.7. Permanent measures 
under art 2.2 require an appropriate volume of evidence that is also conclusive. 
However, under art 5.7, provisional measures may only be implemented in the 
absence of an appropriate volume of evidence, whether or not the evidence is 
conclusive. Figure 1 below indicates how these provisions operate in practice. 
Figure 1: Uncertainty and the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary  








                                                                 
160  Amicus curiae brief, above n 157, 36. 
161  Wittenberg and Cock, above n 132, 60. 
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The differing treatment given to the word ‘sufficiency’ means that states are 
expected to undertake a risk assessment where an appropriate volume of 
evidence exists, whether or not that evidence is conclusive. However, by pushing 
inconclusive evidence into the risk assessment process, it becomes impossible to 
justify proposed measures, because they are based on inconclusive evidence; 
hence they lack a rational relationship to the scientific evidence.162 This 
standpoint is inconsistent with the formulation of the precautionary approach, 
which does not confine uncertainty to lack of quantity of scientific evidence, but 
also permits precautionary measures where the scientific evidence is 
inconclusive, although supported by preliminary evidence as, for example, in a 
‘plausible hypothesis’. Moreover, by not acknowledging that inconclusive 
evidence can also be ‘insufficient’, the WTO Appellate Body has steered the 
inquiry of scientific evidence ever deeper towards the risk assessment process. 
As one commentator has indicated, this can deflect a regulatory response away 
from uncertainty and towards perceptions of risk.163  
VI Uncertainty or Perception of Risk 
Drawing from the discussion thus far, uncertainty may be considered as a level 
of knowledge that is insufficient to conclude with confidence whether a species 
will become invasive, whether a pathway is likely to introduce IAS, and the 
nature of the relationship of IAS with co-stressors to biodiversity. It may stem 
from uncertainty in the volume, conclusiveness or agreed understanding of the 
scientific evidence. A perception of risk, on the other hand, may be viewed as a 
subjective evaluation of the degree to which a person is concerned about 
assessments that address whether a species will become invasive, whether a 
pathway is likely to introduce IAS, and the impact of co-stressors to biodiversity 
on those factors.164 
Uncertainty, therefore, is based on knowledge or, more precisely, lack of 
knowledge, while risk depends on how much a person cares about the 
consequences of an event going wrong. The subjective nature of the perception 
of ‘risk’ means that it can represent different things to different people. It may be 
influenced by social, cultural and inter-personal factors,165 including how 
risk-averse an individual is. A perception of risk may not even have a clear 
                                                                 
162  Japan – Apples, above n 103, [162]–[163]. 
163  Peel, above n 44, 497–500. 
164  Lennart Sjöberg, Bjørg-Elin Moen and T Torbjørn Rundmo, Explaining Risk Perception Rotunde 
(Norwegian University of Science and Technology, 2004) [1.2]; see also R Kasperson et al,  
‘The Social Amplification of Risk: A Conceptual Framework’ (1988) 8 Risk Analysis 177. 
165  Kasperson et al, above n 164, 132, 177. 
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connection with actual risk;166 the latter is a calculation of the likelihood of harm 
occurring, rather than how one perceives the threat of that harm.167  
Although uncertainty and perception of risk differ, they are linked, as an 
incomplete knowledge base or an unknown outcome can influence perceptions 
of risk.168 For this reason, WTO members may only implement measures to 
achieve their ALOP where they are able to identify objective risks that are 
neither speculative, nor theoretical, nor negligible.169 Yet, where there are gaps 
and uncertainties in knowledge, it may be problematic distinguishing whether a 
risk is speculative, theoretical or negligible – or indeed whether it will breach a 
state’s ALOP. This is the case, even though the Panel of the WTO has held that 
the risk does not necessarily need to reach a certain magnitude or threshold.170  
In Japan — Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples, Recourse to 
Article 21.5 (‘Japan — Apples 21.5’)171 the Panel examined the level of risk 
associated with mature symptomless apples acting as a vector for transmission of 
fire blight: 
The Original Panel concluded that there was not sufficient scientific 
evidence that apple fruit are likely to serve as a pathway for the entry, 
establishment or spread of fire blight within Japan. The Panel nonetheless 
… considered that the scientific evidence ‘does suggest that some slight 
risk of contamination cannot be excluded.’ [The current Panel therefore 
cannot] agree with the United States that [a negligible risk] … should be 
completely assimilated to a ‘theoretical risk’.172 
Although the Panel conceded that a negligible risk is not to be equated 
with a theoretical risk, the use of the word ‘negligible’ can nevertheless be ill 
conceived. In one sense, the likelihood of an event happening might be 
‘negligible’, but it may not be appropriate to use the word ‘negligible’ to 
describe a low probability event if it has a high potential for damage, such as 
                                                                 
166  By way of example, commentators have pointed to the fact that states’ perception of the risks of 
genetically modified food products varies in accordance with ‘differing interest groups, whose 
values underpin different national regulatory paradigms’. See Aynsley Kellow, Marcus Haward 
and Kristy Welch, ‘Salmon and Fruit Salad: Australia’s Response to World Trade Organization 
Quarantine Disputes’ (2005) 40 Australian Journal of Political Science 17, 30. 
167  Matthew JW Cock, Biosecurity and Forests: An Introduction — With Particular Emphasis on 
Forest Pests (FAO Forest Health and Biosecurity Working Paper FBS/2E, 2003) FAO,  
9 <http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/006/J1467E/J1467E00.HTM>; for a short analysis from  
a different discipline, see K McMunigal, ‘Distinguishing Risk from Harm in Conflict of Interest’ 
(1998) 100–101 Business and Society Review 91. 
168  Sjöberg, Moen and Rundmo, above n 164, [1.2]. 
169  For a discussion of this point in the context of the Cartagena Protocol (Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature 29 January 2000 
(entered into force 11 September 2003)), see Hutchinson, above n 44, [5.4]; EC – Hormones, 
above n 14, [186]. 
170  Australia – Salmon, above n 48, [123]–[124]. The level of risk, however, might be relevant to the 
choice of measures.  
171  Panel Report, Japan – Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples, Recourse to Article 21.5, 
WTO Doc WT/DS245/RW (23 June 2005) (‘Japan – Apples 21.5’).  
172  Ibid [8.40].  
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often occurs with damage caused by IAS.173 In these instances, the word 
‘negligible’ is seemingly used in a heuristic sense to describe the likelihood of 
the event happening, while glossing over matters relevant to the design of 
regimes, such as lack of knowledge, or lack of conclusiveness presented in the 
available information. 
A risk-averse regulator charged with preventing entry of IAS would treat 
uncertainty as a reason to implement measures that minimise or prevent the entry 
of potentially invasive species, whereas a risk-inclined regulator would consider 
uncertainty as justification for not implementing measures. It is precisely for this 
reason that the formulation of the precautionary approach focuses on knowledge, 
rather than perceptions of risk.  
In theory, the precautionary approach could be incorporated into a state’s 
ALOP as a statement of policy. However, the setting of an ALOP and the 
consequential measures that give effect to the ALOP are exercises that need to be 
balanced against trade-related considerations, such as minimising negative trade 
impacts174 and achieving cost-benefit justification between quarantine measures 
and their impact on trade.175 Although integrating uncertainty into quarantine 
regimes is challenging, Australia has pioneered a process known as the Weed 
Risk Assessment (WRA)176 that is specifically designed to do this.177 Analogous 
processes are also being formulated for animals.178  
                                                                 
173  D Adamson and D Cook, ‘Re-examining Economic Options for Import Risk Assessments’ 
(Paper presented at AARES Conference, Queenstown, New Zealand, 13–16 February 2007) 6 
<http://www.uq.edu.au/rsmg/WP/ WPM07_3.pdf>; P Vitousek et al, ‘Introduced Species:  
A Significant Component of Human-Caused Global Change’ (1997) 21(1) New Zealand Journal 
of Ecology 1, 9. 
174  SPSA arts 2.2 and 5.4. Article 2.2 provides that quarantine measures should only be applied ‘to 
the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health’, while art 5.4 stresses that 
members should take into account the objective of minimising negative trade effects. 
175  SPSA art 5.2 provides that, when members are undertaking a risk assessment, they should take 
into account ‘the potential damage in terms of loss of production or sales in the event of the 
entry, establishment or spread of a pest or disease … and the cost-effectiveness of alternative 
approaches to limiting risks’. 
176  DAFF, The Weed Risk Assessment System (22 October 2008) <http://www.daff.gov.au/ba/ 
reviews/weeds/system>. See also T Low, ‘Preventing Alien Invasions. The Precautionary 
Principle in Practice in Weed Risk Assessment in Australia’ in R Cooney and B Dickson (eds), 
Biodiversity and the Precautionary Principle: Risk and Uncertainty in Conservation and 
Sustainable Use (Earthscan, 2005) 141. 
177  Ibid. The process is becoming popular and is being used by other states, such as Ecuador with 
respect to the Galapagos Islands: H Rogg, C Buddenhagen and C Causton, ‘Experiences and 
Limitations with Pest Risk Analysis in the Galapagos Islands’ in IPPC Secretariat, Identification 
of Risks and Management of Invasive Alien Species Using the IPPC Framework (2005) 
(Proceedings of the workshop on invasive alien species, Braunschweig, Germany, 22–26 
September 2003) 120. The authors also note that the WRA has limitations because it does not 
assess pathways of introduction of alien species. 
178  See generally, Mary Bomford, Risk Assessment for the Import and Keeping of Exotic Vertebrates 
in Australia (Bureau of Rural Sciences, 2003); Biosecurity SA, South Australian Pest Animal 
Risk Assessment (8 November 2011) <http://www.pir.sa.gov.au/biosecuritysa/nrm_biosecurity/ 
pest_animal/sa_pest_animal_risk_assessment>; Mary Bomford, Risk Assessment Models for 
Establishment of Exotic Vertebrates in Australia and New Zealand (Invasive Animals 
Cooperative Research Centre, Bureau of Rural Sciences, 2008). 
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VII Australia’s Weed Risk Assessment 
The WRA is an evaluation process developed under the leadership of Paul 
Pheloung.179 It calculates whether a plant is likely to become a weed in 
Australia180 and can also identify whether an applicant has provided sufficient 
information to permit regulators to make a determination of weediness. The 
WRA is becoming increasingly accepted, having been adopted by other states, 
including New Zealand, some parts of the USA181 and the Galapagos Islands.182 
As used in Australia, the WRA183 comprises 49 questions concerning the 
plant proposed to be imported that cover matters such as the plant’s 
distribution,184 whether the plant is toxic to animals,185 whether it hybridises 
naturally,186 and information about its dispersal.187 The answers are scored,188 
and a minimum number of questions must be answered. In scoring answers, the 
WRA largely steers clear of weighting scores, because of difficulties in 
demonstrating a scientific basis for this process; however, answers from five 
questions are subject to weighting. These questions relate to the weediness of the 
plant overseas, especially in countries with similar climate conditions to 
Australia.189 Weighting in these cases is considered appropriate in order to take 
full advantage of the classification capabilities of the system.190  
The scores generated by the WRA identify three groupings of plants: 
‘permitted’, ‘prohibited’ or ‘further evaluate’.191 The ‘further evaluate’ category 
applies either where applicants have provided insufficient information to 
determine weediness or where the information is inconclusive and the 
assessment process ‘cannot clearly differentiate between a weed and 
non-weed’.192 If the species requires further evaluation, it is denied entry until 
                                                                 
179  Paul Pheloung is the Program Manager at DAFF. 
180  NWRAS Review Group, Review of the National Weed Risk Assessment System (30 November 
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187  NWRAS Review Group, above n 180, 31. 
188  DAFF, above n 176.  
189  NWRAS Review Group, above n 180, 31. 
190  Ibid. 
191  Ibid 19. 
192  Ibid. 
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additional information is obtained.193 This type of determination is sometimes 
referred to as placing a species onto a ‘grey list’.  
The WRA procedure does not subject the species to a full risk assessment, 
yet it can still identify risks and, importantly, areas where scientific evidence is 
lacking and/or uncertain. Indeed, the process guides decision-makers towards 
taking into account both the risk the species presents and also the quality of 
available scientific evidence.194 The latter is significant because WRA processes 
potentially represent a way of bridging the divide between precaution, scientific 
certainty and risk.195 First, by focussing on the extent and conclusiveness of 
scientific knowledge, the WRA can pinpoint whether it is plausible that a species 
will become invasive or a threat to biodiversity; secondly, the system can also 
trigger measures where there is so little evidence that it is not possible to identify 
whether the plant is likely to become a weed. In both cases the WRA prompts 
the implementation of precautionary measures, namely, refusing entry to the 
species until more information is obtained. In many respects, the WRA draws 
out commonalities between art 5.7 of the SPSA and the precautionary approach.  
For example, both art 5.7 and the WRA contemplate remedial measures 
where the scientific evidence is insufficient in quantity. Although art 5.7 only 
permits temporary measures, this does not fly in the face of either the WRA or 
the precautionary approach. There is nothing in the formulation of either to 
indicate that precautionary measures should be permanent. If insufficiencies or 
uncertainties in the scientific evidence are removed, measures may be revised. 
Indeed, the CBD Guiding Principles emphasise the need for members to monitor 
and update their IAS regimes196 and also to manage IAS in accordance with 
adaptive management practices recommended by the ecosystem approach.197  
In particular, the ecosystem approach encourages regulators to make small but 
incrementally significant management decisions that are monitored and 
refined.198 Moreover, the notion of using a risk assessment process to identify 
uncertainty is not contrary to the precautionary approach and principles that 
underpin the CBD. As already noted, principle 1 of the CBD Guiding Principles 
specifies that measures should be ‘based on the precautionary approach … with 
reference to risk analysis’. 
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However, notwithstanding this common ground, the WRA has not been 
directly tested in the WTO. It is not certain, for example, whether the type of 
provisional importation ban imposed under the WRA accords with states’ 
obligations pursuant to art 5.7 of the SPSA. To start with, states could have 
differing perceptions as to whether sufficient information has been provided to 
carry out a full risk assessment, which could lead to challenges in order to 
determine whether a species has been correctly categorised onto a ‘grey list’.  
Furthermore, art 5.7 does not define what is meant by a ‘reasonable time’. 
The WTO Appellate Body has indicated that the concept of reasonableness 
should be determined on a case-by-case basis.199 However, given that it is not 
uncommon for the invasive potential of a species to take up to 170 years to 
manifest,200 the meaning of ‘reasonable’ presents an abundant source of conflict. 
One state might consider that two or three years is a reasonable time-frame for 
reassessing temporary measures,201 while another state might consider a 
considerably longer time more reasonable.  
In addition, a more basic concern is whether the WRA potentially 
conflicts with the underlying precepts of the risk assessment process as 
conceptualised by the SPSA. This is a particularly significant issue with regard to 
‘grey lists’, where the scientific evidence used to create these lists is uncertain or 
inconclusive.  
As discussed in part 4 above, in dealing with uncertainty, regulators 
balance avoiding two types of errors: type I errors that give false positive results 
and type II errors that give false negative results.202 In the case of IAS, a false 
positive result wrongly indicates that a species will become invasive or cause 
environmental harm, while a false negative result erroneously concludes that a 
species will not become invasive or will not cause environmental harm.  
In scientific research the aim is to reduce type I errors, but commentators have 
questioned whether the same approach is appropriate to environmental 
regulation. In this case, the main purpose should be to reduce type II errors.203 
This concern is reflected in the development of the precautionary approach, 
which permits regulators to ward off type II errors.204 It is a particularly 
important regulatory tool, where the consequences of a type II error are 
irreversible, such as the extinction of species. 205  
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The initial determination by regulators, whether they wish to avoid type I 
or type II errors, shapes the choice of the supporting hypothesis that instigates 
the decision-making process. The supporting hypothesis, called the ‘null 
hypothesis’, is the hypothesis being tested and it stands unless rejected or 
disproved by scientific evidence.206 
With respect to IAS, the choice of a null hypothesis to avoid type I errors 
would be expounded in terms of alien species not being invasive. Accordingly, 
where scientific evidence is incomplete or inconclusive, it is unlikely that the 
null hypothesis will be disproved, thus allowing species entry. This would be the 
case even though scientists have pointed out that a ‘failure to reject the null 
hypothesis’ does not prove the hypothesis.207 Yet where the evidence is sparse or 
inconclusive, the danger is that the outcome will lead to a type II error.208 The 
manner in which art 5.7 of the SPSA operates is a case in point. It is an approach 
designed to reduce type I errors, especially those that can hinder international 
trade. By way of contrast, in its practical operation, the WRA is predicated on 
avoiding type II errors (false negatives).  
This is akin to ‘equivalence testing’, a process which reformulates the 
null hypothesis so that the unwanted outcome becomes the new starting point.209 
In the case of IAS, the null hypothesis would rest on a presumption that the 
species in question is invasive. Where the information is not conclusive, 
regulators can employ notions of plausibility, as proposed by Simberloff,210  
to determine a level of threat to biodiversity and use this knowledge to prevent 
entry of species until further information is obtained.  
Although driven by science, the WRA process is nevertheless contentious 
because it also accommodates an information-based evaluation of the evidence. 
It has, for example, engendered a degree of criticism in Australia. In a review of 
the WRA in 2005, stakeholders censured the ‘potential for false positives’ and 
the ‘number of species scoring as “further evaluate”’.211 This type of criticism 
demonstrates concern over whether WRA processes are fully consistent with 
art 5.7 of the SPSA. 
VIII Conclusion 
The problem of uncertainty in IAS regulation can be viewed from different 
perspectives, depending on whether the problem is seen through the lens of 
international environmental law or international trade law. Where the problem 
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can be framed in different ways, the literature highlights the benefits of taking a 
‘relational approach’ to uncertainty. This means that regulators should address 
uncertainty from the perspective of all stakeholders, rather than solely from one 
standpoint. 
Yet regulators dealing with IAS must reconcile the strategies of two 
international regimes that evince sufficient differences to make taking a 
relational approach to uncertainty problematic. At the heart of the dilemma lie 
difficulties in identifying the threshold of harm or potential harm that can trigger 
the application of measures. The precautionary approach indicates that 
uncertainty should not be a bar to implementing measures in order to prevent 
serious environmental harm; while notions of scientific certainty require 
measures to be underpinned by a sufficient volume of conclusive scientific 
evidence.  
One promising means of drawing these two concepts together lies in the 
use of a risk assessment, such as Australia’s WRA. This process can identify 
potentially invasive species stemming from gaps in knowledge or inconclusive 
evidence. In the latter case, the evaluation provides a method of establishing 
‘plausible hypotheses’ that can prevent entry of species until further information 
is obtained. The process still requires a level of scientific evidence to 
demonstrate a risk to the environment. However, once that level of evidence is 
attained, the implementation of preventative measures proceeds notwithstanding 
lack of full scientific certainty. The alternative, in accordance with WTO 
systems, is to channel inconclusive evidence into a full risk assessment, where 
the very lack of scientific certainty leads to measures being declared invalid.  
Ultimately, the manner in which uncertainty is managed needs to be 
re-evaluated at an international level. Taking a relational approach to uncertainty 
would mean that IAS are viewed as a trade and environment problem rather than 
a trade or environment problem. This would encourage regulators to find 
resourceful solutions that that take into account the needs of stakeholders from 
every relevant regime. 
